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UTILITY FRANCHISES AND MUNICIPAL
RATE REGULATION IN NORTH DAKOTA:
SOME STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
DANIEL E. BUCHANAN*
The North Dakota Constitution provides for a public service
commission.' It does not, however, give any powers and duties to
the PSC, that being left to the legislature.2 While the legislature
has acted over the years to carry out its constitutional mandate to
prescribe the powers and duties of the PSC, it has, nevertheless,
placed upon the courts the duty of reminding the PSC of its origins,
and of the limits of its delegated powers. Thus, it has been said
that the PSC "possesses only the authority conferred upon it by the
constitution and the statutes of the state, and that all orders made
by it must conform with the statutes to be valid."3 In other words
the PSC "is a constitutional body having only such powers and
duties as are prescribed by law. ' 4 It follows that orders issued.by
the PSC which are outside its powers are necessarily void as fall-
ing beyond the purview of the statutes.3
Besides granting powers to the PSC, the statutes also prescribe
the manner of exercising those powers. The PSC can act only in
the mode prescribed. In addition, it cannot "rightfully dispense with
any of the essential forms of procedure which the legislature -has
prescribed for the purpose of investing it with the power to act."6
To say that the North Dakota PSC is the state agency clothed
with the power and expertise to regulate the various public utilities
* B.A., Jamestown College 1959; J.D., University of North Dakota 1968. Mr. Bu-
chanan served on the legal staff of the Public Service Commission from August, 1969
to May, 1972.
1. N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 82. The Public Service Commission will be hereinafter re-
ferred to as the PSC.
2. N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 83.
3. Lyons v. Otter Tail Power Co., 68 N.D. 403, 280 N.W. 192, 194 (1938).
4. Public Serv. Comm'n. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 100 N.W.2d 140, 143 (N.D.
1959).
5. Id. at 143-44.
6. Petition of Village Board of Wheatland, 77 N.D. 194, 42 N.W.2d 821, 385 (1950);
accord, State v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 75 N.W.2d 129, 134 (N.D. 1956).
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operating in the state may be reassuring to some, but the state-
ment is incorrect in at least one respect. The State Supreme Court
has stated that the PSC "has only such powers, in the regulation
of public utilities, as have been conferred upon it by the legisla-
ture. 1 7 Accordingly, it is important to look at the statutory lan-
guage which gives the commission the following powers: (1) gener-
al jurisdiction over public utilities;8 (2) general and some specific
powers respecting utilities;9 (3) power to regulate utility services; 10
and (4) an express denial of authority to exercise any regulatory
power over certain types of utilities.1'
One of the most important, but perhaps least comprehended
powers given to the PSC, is the power to establish utility rates. In
rather all-encompassing words, the legislature has declared:
The commission shall supervise the rates of all public util-
ities. It shall have the power, after notice and hearing, to
originate, establish, modify, adjust, promulgate, and enforce
tariffs, rates, joint rates, and charges of all public utili-
ties. Whenever the commission, after hearing, shall find any
existing rates, tariffs, joint rates, or schedules unjust, un-
reasonable, insufficient, unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise
in violation of any of the provisions of this title, the com-
mission by order shall fix reasonable rates, joint rates,
charges, or schedules to be followed in the future in lieu
of those found to be unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, un-justly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of any pro-
vision of law. 12
The North Dakota Supreme Court has construed this statute as im-
posing a continuing duty to supervise utility rates, coupled with the
necessary regulatory power given to the commission.1 3 A compre-
hensive definition of what constitutes a utility rate is given by
statute,14 and includes rules, regulations, practices, or contracts af-
fecting the utility's compensation, charges, and the like. The other
words used in this general ratemaking statute, e.g., such words as
"tariffs," "charges," and "schedules" are not defined. However,
they may be interpreted as synonymous with "rates.' 5 1
7. Williams Elec. Cooperative v. Montana-Dakota Utl. Co., 79 N.W.2d 508, 516-17
(N.D. 1956).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-01 (1960).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-02 (1960).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-04 (1960).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-01.1 (Supp. 1971). Since the commission has only such
powers as are prescribed by law, an express denial of authority is unnecessary, but
noteworthy.
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-03 (1960).
13. Public Serv. Comm'n. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 100 N.W.2d 140, 152 (N.D.
1959).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-01-01(4) (1960).
15. a. tarrif-a listing or scale of rates or charges for a business or a public utility.
b. charges--the price demanded for a thing or service.
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In addition to the powers bestowed upon the PSC, (eliminating
rates which it has found to be unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, un-
justly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of any provision of
law) the legislature has also prohibited the making, demanding, or
receiving by a utility of any unjust and unreasonable rate or
charge.16 In the event a utility has charged an excessive or dis-
criminatory amount for its service, or has discriminated against a
consumer under its schedules, rates, and tariffs on file, a procedure
is set up for a complaint against the utility, along with possible
reparation to the wronged party.17 To avoid this complaint, all
rules and regulations made by any public utility affecting or per-
taining to its rates or services to the public are required to be
just and reasonable. 8 The utilities may not change their rates with-
out the permission of the PSC nor can they change their rules,
practices, or regulations without such approval. 9 The legislature
has placed the burden of showing the reasonableness of such
changes2 in rates or rules, regulations, or practices on the utility
applying therefore.
In spite of the statutory powers given to the PSC to regulate
or establish utility rates, and the statutory restraints placed on the
utilities with respect to their rates, there is one area in which the
rules don't apply with the predictability that one might expect.
Where rates for municipal uses are set by franchise, the PSC is
without power to exert its otherwise considerable ratemaking in-
fluence.
An early case 21 in which the then board of railroad commis-
sioners (predecessor of the PSC) was not a party, but in which
the PSC's authority to regulate rates was in issue involved a fran-
chise ordinance adopted by the City of Jamestown. The city had
granted an electric company the right to use its streets for poles,
wires and the transmission of electricity, in the operation of an
electric light and power plant. By the terms of the franchise, the
company was obligated to furnish power to light the city hall, the
offices therein, and the engine house, without cost to the city. In
addition, the company was to provide water pumping service for
the city at a flat rate.
As time went on, the utility and the city fell into disagreement
over the rates that the city should be paying for the service be-
e. schedues-a written or printed formal list (as a schedule of freight rates).
WEs IsR'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DircrToNARY (Unabridged, 1971).
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-04-02 (1960).
17. N.D. CENT. COD s 49-02-15 (1960).
18. N.D. CENT. COD § 49-04-17 (1960).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-05-06 (Supp. 1971).
20. Id.21. Western Elec. Co. v. City of Jamestown, 47 N.D. 157, 181 N.W. 868 (1921).
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ing rendered, the utility insisting that the city pay a higher rate
than in the franchise, and the city refusing. It was contended by
the utility that from and after the effective date of the Public
Utilities Act, the contract rates set in the 1902 franchise were su-
perseded. The basis of the utility's contention was that the effect
of the act was to make unlawful any free supply of utility service,
or any supply charge at a low or discriminatory rate. Thus, it was
contended that after the Public Utilities Act became effective, the
utility would violate state law by rendering service to the city at
rates below fair, just, and reasonable rates charged to anyone else
for a similar service.
The court met a number of the utility's contentions by stating
some principles22 which it found relevant to the construction of the
state's new Public Utilities Act. The Act, said the court, granted to
the board of railroad commissioners regulatory ratemaking powers
over public utilities. It did not deprive a city of its powers and
privileges in creating or enforcing a franchise granted to a utility
for the use of its streets. Furthermore, the court emphasized that
the Act did not pretend to grant the commissioners the power to
determine what shall be the consideration for the use or exercise
of the privilege of a franchise in a city. Moreover, as if by way
of placing future legislatures on notice that there were limits to
the authority that could be given to a regulatory board, the court
asserted that the constitution 23 specifically reserved to cities the
authority to grant or permit franchises to utility companies for the
use of city streets, and to regulate the use of the same.
24
The court then turned to a discussion of what the franchise
granted to the utility really was, calling it a "right of value, a
right of property, and validly, the subject of a legal contract. ' 25
Further, the franchise given by Jamestown was characterized as
being a "contract between the state (through the municipality rep-
resenting the state by its permission) and the company. ' 26 The
court declared that "the city had the right to exact a charge for
22. Id. at 367.
23. Id.
24. N.D. CONST. art 6, § 139:
No law shall be passed by the legislative assembly granting the right to
construct and operate a street railroad, telegraph, telephone or electric
light plant within any city, town or incorporated village, without requiring
the consent of the local authorities having the control of the street or high-
way proposed to be occupied for such purposes.
But see City of Grafton v. Otter Tail Power Co., 86 N.W.2d 197, 205 (N.D. 1957):
Section 139 of the Constitution is not a grant of power to municipalities
but a restriction upon the legislature designed to prevent it from authorizing
indiscriminate use of the streets of a municipality by certain enumerated
public utilities without control by the local authorities. To that extent It
is a limitation upon the sovereign power of the state.
25. Western Elec. Co. v. City of Jamestown, 47 N.D. 157, 181 N.W. 368, 367 (1921).
26. Id.
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the use of its streets as a consideration for the franchise. ' ' 27 In
order to illustrate the forms that consideration for franchises may
permissibly take, and perhaps to dispel fears that cities would be
bargaining with their police power, the court explained that:
The consideration for the exercise of this right might
have been evidenced by the payment of a stipulated sum
of money annually, or otherwise by the payment of a per-
centage of the gross or net revenues of the company earn-
ed in the city, or by doing certain service in and upon
the streets or highways of the city and by furnishing as an
equivalent, in lieu of money, a certain service or a cer-
tain commodity for the city's use. This furnishing of a
certain service or a certain commodity for the city's public
use may not be termed a bargaining of the municipal or
state police power concerning rates, in the absence of a re-
strictive or prohibitive constitutional or legislative provi-
sion, but rather the "quid pro quo" of, or the consideration
for, the exercise of the franchise. 2
It may well be that a city could demand and receive some form
of consideration for the privileges it conferred upon public utilities
by the grant of a franchise. But if the consideration took the form
of a special rate for the city's use, as it had in Jamestown, how
could such rates be reconciled with statutory commands that rates
not be discriminatory, or below rates charged others for similar
service? That question was handled with this language:
Presumably under the contract the service so render-
ed by the plaintiff (utility) is reasonably compensatory for
the privilege so exercised by the plaintiff (utility). And like-
wise the value of this franchise might reasonably and pre-
sumptively measure the difference between the amount of
actual charge in fact made to and paid by the city and
the amount of the reasonable charge for the service ren-
dered. The rate charged therefor under the contract cannot
be termed in any event unreasonable or discriminatory.29
In holding that the Public Utilities Act had no application to
the electric service rendered to the city by the terms of the fran-
chise, the court warned that the right of a city to contract for
consideration to be paid by a public utility, when the city consents
to a franchise, was not to be confused with the state or municipal
police power to regulate public service rates or a public utility. 0
27. Id. at 368.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Christianson cited two
sections of the Public Utilities Act,3 1 but noted that the board of
railroad commissioners had made no adjudication that the rates
agreed upon between the City of Jamestown and the electric com-
pany were discriminatory, or that the railroad commissioners had
taken any action whatsoever regarding those rates.3 2 Moreover, he
noted that the rates in question were already in existence when the
Public Utilities Act became effective. The Chief Justice found the
rights of the parties before the court dependent upon and measured
by their contracts.3 3 He expressed no opinion as to whether the
Public Utilities Act gave the commission the authority to change a
rate which had been agreed upon between the public utility and a
city for compensation for services rendered to the city (as distin-
guished from maximum rates fixed in the franchise to be charged
customers generally)84 and under which rate, stipulated in the fran-
chise, the public utility was to operate. Nor did he "express any
opinion as to whether Section 139 of the state constitution gave the
legislature the authority to confer upon a public utility commission
the power to change or alter such rates."3 5
It took approximately eight more years for a case to reach the
State Supreme Court in which the board of railroad commissioners
had taken action concerning rates set by a franchise for service
to a city for municipal uses.3 6 The then village of Belfield, in 1915,
gave a franchise to an electric light company, the terms requiring
the company to furnish electricity to the village for street lighting
purposes at stated rates. In 1919, and after the village had been
incorporated as a city, an ordinance was adopted amending the
franchise and calling for an increase in rates to be paid by the
city for street lighting. The utility filed its acceptance of the amend-
ed ordinance with the city.
However, about a year and a half later, the utility filed an ap-
plication with the board of railroad commissioners, asking for a
rate increase, both as to the city, and as to the inhabitants there-
of. In May, 1921, the commission granted the utility higher rates
applicable to the city for street lighting. Thereafter, and until Jan-
uary, 1927, the city paid for electricity at the rates specified by
the board of railroad commissioners. After that date, the city re-
fused to pay according to the rates set by the commission, but of-
fered to pay in accordance with the rates specified in the franchise.
31. Id. at 869.
92. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 364. $.15 per kwh was set by the franchise as the maximum rate for all
consumers.
35. Id. at 870.
86. Chrysler Light & Power Co. V. City of Belfield, 58 N.D. 88, 224 N.W. 871 (1929).
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Justice Christianson, who apparently had some reservations about
the sweep of the court's decision in Western Electric, wrote the
unanimous opinion of the court in Belfield. The issue not pre-
sented in the former case was now squarely before the justices,
and was stated by the court as follows:
(1) Is the plaintiff (utility) entitled to compensation in
accordance with the rates agreed upon in the franchise or
is it entitled to be compensated according to the rates pre-
scribed by the board of railroad commissioners? 37
The court began its determination by setting out the text of
Section 139 of the state constitution, and by saying this about it:
The power reserved by section 139 of the Constitution
to a village or city to either grant or refuse permission to
an electric light company to occupy the streets of such
village or city with the structures of such lighting company
is not limited to a simple granting or denial of permission
to use the streets for such purposes; a village or city may
permit such use of its streets on certain conditions only,
and, if the electric light company accepts the permission
or franchise so granted, all valid conditions or restrictions
attached thereto become binding upon it.38
Then the court continued by saying that the village (or city) of
Belfield had the power to require compensation for the use of its
streets by the electric company; that ". . . it might stipulate, as
it did, that certain service should be furnished to the city at a
certain stipulated price; it might even have stipulated that such
service should be furnished to the city without charge."3 9 As for
the utility company, the court said the utility's acceptance of the
franchise resulted in the acceptance of the conditions therein. In
other words, the utility cannot be relieved from its contract nor
can another be made in its place because it failed to make an ad-
vantageous bargain with the city.4 0
The court found the franchise between the city and the utility
a binding contract to the extent that rates were agreed upon with
the respective rights of the parties measured thereby.41 However,
the court turned to the Public Utilities Act to determine if there
was anything in it which gave the board of railroad commissioners
legitimate authority over those franchise rates determined to be the
legal rates for the municipal service rendered to Belfield. The court
37. Id. at 874.
88. Id.
39. Id. at 874-75.
40. Id. at 875.
41. Id.
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began by noting that "the board of railroad commissioners has only
such powers to regulate rates of public utilities as have been con-
ferred upon it by the Legislature. Such board can initiate no public
policies of its own; it can act in no field which the Legislature
has not authorized it to enter. ' 42 The court continued by stating
that rate regulatory power was conferred on the board by the Pub-
lic Utilities Act of 1919, and that the act furnishes the sole basis
for the power sought to be exercised by the board in making the
order an issue 43 in the instant litigation. Furthermore, the opinion
stated, if the power in the board to make a rate order as it made
in the Belfield case is not conferred on the board by the legislative
enactment, the power admittedly does not exist.4 4
We fail to find in the Public Utilities Act any language
indicative of a legislative intention to confer any authority
upon the board of railroad commissioners to interfere with
the rates for electric current to be furnished by an electric
light company to a city, where such rates are fixed by
contract in the franchise granted by the city to the electric
light company.4
5
Having so construed the Public Utilities Act, the court then quoted
from the following its holding in Western Electric.4 6 It would seem
sufficiently clear that the board of railroad commissioners had ex-
ceeded its authority in the Belfield case, from what the court had
already said. However, the court offered a postscript to its opinion
in that regard, and met the question of legislative power to grant
the authority or exercise it itself, by writing:
It is unnecessary to consider whether the Legislature
can interfere with rates for electric current for street light-
ing, which have been fixed in the franchise granted by a
city to an electric light company. The question of legisla-
tive power to interfere with such rates can arise only when
and if the Legislature attempts to interfere with such rates,
or to confer upon some regulatory board the power to do
so, and we are wholly agreed that the Legislature has not
conferred or attempted to confer any such authority upon
the board of railrload commissioners by chapter 192, Laws
1919. The order entered by the railroad commission was
clearly outside of its powers; such order created no obliga-
tions and vested no rights.4
7
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Western Elec. Co. v. City of Jamestown, 47 N.D. 157, 169, 181 N.W.
363, 367.
47. Id.
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A generation passed before another case involving electric rates
to a city set by the terms of a franchise found its way to the
Supreme Court.4 8 One questions why the case was prosecuted, since
the statutory authority49 under which the PSC felt itself compelled
to act was almost identical to the corresponding section in the
Public Utilities Act of 191950 which had been construed by the
court as giving no authority to the board of railroad commissioners.
The case was initiated by the Public Service Commission's order
to Montana Dakota Utilities Company and the City of Williston
to show cause why the rate agreed upon in a contract between
the city and the utility for electricity for municipal uses should
not be found unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, and
otherwise in violation of law, and why the commission should not
by order fix a reasonable rate to be followed in the future. Upon
the hearing of the order to show cause, the PSC concluded that
the rate Williston was paying for power for its municipal uses
was in violation of law. The court noted further that a tariff
previously filed and approved for the utility's patrons, at rates
higher than those complained of, should govern the relations of
the parties. Both the city and the utility appealed the commission's
order, contending that the commission lacked jurisdiction in the
matter, because the contract which established the rate to the
city included, as part of the consideration therefor, the granting
by the city of a franchise to the utility to use the streets and
public ways of the city. Thus, it was argued that Section 139 of the
state constitution made such a contract exclusively within the auth-
ority of the city.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the district court, followed
its earlier decisions on the subjects' by expressly setting out the
previous language which had determined that the value of a fran-
chise may well measure the difference between the amount paid
by a city, and the reasonable charge for the service,52 and that
a rate charged under such a contract cannot be termed unreasonable
or discriminatory. It also expressly reaffirmed its earlier holding"
that the commission had not been conferred any authority to inter-
fere with the rates for electricity furnished a city where the rates
are fixed by contract in the franchise granted by the city to the
electric utility.
In following its earlier precedent, the court determined that
48. Public Service Comnm'n v. City of Williston, 160 N.W.2d 534 (N.D. 1968).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-03 (1960).
50. N.D. SEss. LAws ch. 192 (1919).
51. N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 139. Public Service Comm'n v. City of Williston, 160
N.W.2d 684, 536 (N.D. 1968).
52. Id.
58. Id. at 537.
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the city was entitled to something for the franchise, that the rate
was not discriminatory or unjust and that the relationship between
the city and the utility under the circumstances was beyond the
reach of the regulatory powers conferred on the PSC. However,
it was argued by Northern States Power Company, (NSP)5 4 in an
amicus curiae brief, that the then board of railroad commissioners
had made a determination, only two years after the Western Electric
decision, which, in effect, reversed the court. The board acknow-
ledged the Supreme Court's ruling that the free service and special
rate given Jamestown was the consideration for the franchise. The
board then found that the free service and the rates were unjustly
discriminatory, and that the practice placed an undue burden on
the utility's consumers, since the utility was indirectly charging
them for the losses it incurred.55 NSP further argued56 that because
of that decision by the board, and other similar ones, the practical
construction of the Public Utilities Act was that the board had
jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates charged cities,
whether part of a franchise or not. Moreover, according to NSP,57
the legislature had approved the board's reversal of the Supreme
Court when it enacted a bill granting villages the power to contract
for electricity or gas. The enactment expressly declared that it
was not to be construed as depriving the board of railroad commis-
sioners of any of its existing regulatory powers with reference
to such contract rates.
The court's response 8 to the disclosure that the board had
reversed the court's earlier decision was understandable and pre-
dictable. It held that the legislature referred to "existing regulatory
powers" in the context of those powers which the Supreme Court
had already determined as belonging to the board. They did not
give the Board any new powers. 59 The court emphasized that if
the legislature had wished to give the commission authority over
the matter of utility rates set by municipal franchise, contrary
to the court's earlier construction of the Public Utilities Act, it
would have specifically so provided. 0 The same result, said the
court, was obtained with respect to a later enactment. 61
Both Northern States Power Company and the PSC argued in
the Williston case that the consequence of the court's ruling in the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 537-38.
58. "The question arises, Under what authority could the Commission have reversed
a decision of the Supreme Court? There is no' such authority." Id. at 538.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 538-39.
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earlier cases was that utility consumers in cities other than the
exacting city would pay for the consideration for franchises, where
it was demanded and received by a city. The PSC contended that
the impact of the Western Electric and Belfield cases was not
felt outside the respective cities because of the status of the electric
industry at that time. Thus the PSC claimed that the court's holding
allowed Williston a bargain rate that would be felt by Montana
Dakota Utility's (MDU) patrons across the state.
In both cases the court's response was the same, namely, that
if NSP's and the PSC's arguments were sound, they should be
addressed to the legislature. 62 However, if the legislature was to
be convinced of the merit of the PSC's argument, another problem
would remain. Section 139 of the state constitution still exists, its
effect not discussed by the court in the Williston case.6 3
It remains to be seen what the legislature will do about the
Williston case. When it does act, either attemping to legislate di-
rectly in the field, or by delegating authority to the public service
commission, the constitutional provision giving the franchise power
to cities or villages will have to be examined anew. The court in
Williston, as in Belfield, found the attempted regulation of rates
set by franchise outside the statutory powers of the PSC and did
not deal with the constitutional question of legislative authority
in the area. To date, the legislature has not granted power to
the PSC to involve itself in matters involving municipal franchises
given to utilities, though the PSC admittedly possesses extensive
regulatory power over the utilities themselves.
The drafters of the state's first comprehensive utility regulatory
statute foresaw that cities would exact payment for franchises.
Thus, they made provisions 64 allowing the utility to capitalize what
it had to pay for the franchise in the same way that all other
property used in providing the utility service is capitalized, and
upon which the utility is entitled to earn a reasonable rate of
return. Local taxes and annual charges are allowed, in addition
to the actual consideration paid to the political subdivision that
charges for the utility's use of the streets, highways, or public
ways. The PSC is required to investigate and determine the value
of the public utility's property, and the determination so made
is known as the utility's rate base. NSP admitted knowledge of
this fact65 in the Williston case, but argues that evils would stem
62. Id. at 539-40.
63. Id. at 540.
64. N.D. SEss. LAws ch. 192 (1919). Now codified as N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-06-01 and
§ 49-06-03 (Supp. 1971).
65. Public Service Conun'n v. City of Williston, 160 N.W.2d 534, 539 (N.D. 1968).
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from allowing the value of the franchise in the rate base if localities
began to compete for a greater piece of the pie. Northern States
Power also suggests that it may not be permissible to compute
and include the value of the franchise component in the rate base
when the consideration for the franchise is a lower rate than the
filed rates. That argument seems unwarranted, however, in light
of the court's repeated holding that the value of the franchise
where a rate is involved is at least the difference between the
rates paid the utility and the regular tariff.86 What has been said
about the statutory requirements that the PSC allow the utilities
to capitalize and include in their rate base the aggregate amounts
paid for their franchises applies equally to any taxes levied on
utility revenues by a municipality which has reserved that power
to itself by means of a home rule charter.67 Finally, it also appears
that there is authority for the PSC to allow a utility to treat fran-
chise payments as a utility expense68 in rate cases. The better
view, however, is to include such payments in the rate base since
the legislature has expressly named franchises as an allowable
component in a utility rate base, whereas it has dealt generally 9
with other expenditures allowed as expense.
One might think that the Williston case settled the matter of
whether a city can exact a consideration for a franchise given
to a utility, and that payments, rate differentials, services provided
at no charge, and the like, would be computed and capitalized in
the utility's rate base. Although the Williston case may have settled
for now the question of whether a city can have a municipal
rate lower than the utility's tariff when the rate is part of the
consideration for a franchise, the matter of how the utility is
to be allowed to handle municipal exactions seems far from settled,
regardless of apparently clear statutory language describing such
handling. In recent years, utilities have filed, and the PSC has
approved, rules and regulations which form part of the rates or
tariffs that permit the utility to surcharge the ratepayers in any
city that exacts something from the utility. One company's formula-
tion provides:
Adjustment for Municipal Payments
In the event that a Municipality collects or receives any
payment or payments from the Company for or by reason
66. Id. at 536. Western Elec. Co. v. City of Jamestown, 47 N.D. 157, 181 N.W. 363,
368 (1921).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05.1-06 (10), (12) (Supp. 1971). N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-06-01
(Supp. 1971) speaks of " . . . any tax or annual charge . . . actually paid to any po-
litical subdivision of the state . . ."
68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-05-05 (Supp. 1971); see Application of Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co., 102 N.W.2d 329, 341 (N.D. 1960).
69. The special provisions should control over general provisions if it be found they
are in conflict, N.D. CENT. CODD § 1-02-07 (1960).
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of the use of the streets, alleys and public places of the
Municipality, or for or by reason of the operation of the util-
ity business or any portion or phase thereof in the Munici-
pality, whether such payments be called a tax, assessment,
license fee, percentage of earnings or revenues, lump sum
payments, or otherwise, or whether such payments are made
under the provisions of any ordinance, resolution, franchise,
permit, or otherwise, bills for electric service in such Munic-
ipality will be increased during the period or periods in which
any such payment or payments are collected or received by
an aggregate amount approximating the amounts of such
payment or payments, and bills rendered under the several
Rate Schedules in effect in such Municipality will be in-
creased by the applicable proportionate part of any such
payment or payments.7 0
What has taken place through the tariff filings, with the
approval of the PSC, is that the utilities are allowed to grant
themselves an ad hoc rate increase on ratepayers using the utility
service within the municipality that exacts a consideration for a
franchise from a utility. Worse still, the rate increase is granted
without a hearing: 1 Under the blanket authorization allowed in
advance, through the vehicle of rules and regulations, the utilities
are not even required to file for approval or suspension7 2 the
rate increases placed into effect when a city takes what it has
a right to take. The PSC, for reasons of its own, apparently prefers
to allow the utilities automatic rate increases instead of taking
the trouble of evaluating the franchise component of the utility's
rate base, with a view to setting reasonable rates for the utility's
entire system. How hollow the PSC's cry of discriminatory rates
sounds in the Williston case when the PSC itself participates in a
form of rate discrimination against cities that exact a consideration
for the grant of a franchise to a utility. How hollow, indeed, the
PSC's cry for fair and reasonable rates in Williston seems as it
waives statutory obligations placed upon it to prevent rate discrimi-
nation and utility-determined rate increases.
CITIES' RESPONSE To WILLISTON AND PREDECESSOR DECISIONS
It may be of interest to review the experiences of a few repre-
sentative cities in North Dakota with utilities, in connection with the
grant of franchises and consideration therefor.
70. Otter Tall Power Company, General Rules and Regulations-Electric, NORTH DA-
KOTA PU3LIC SERvICE CoMMissioN (1970). Northern States Power Company's general
rules and regulations, and those of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company were also
found to have the same purport and effect as Otter Tail's.
71. N.D. CENT. CODS § 49-02-03 (1960) allows the PSC to alter rates, after notice
and hearing.
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-05-06 (Supp. 1971).
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Grand Forks-In November of 1968, the city granted franchises 8
for a period of twenty years to Northern States Power Company to
operate its electric and gas systems in the city. The ordinances re-
cite that, for the privilege of operating its systems under the fran-
chises, the company shall pay a franchise fee equal to two per cent
of the company's gross revenues (as defined) earned in the city. The
fee payable by the company can be raised to three per cent under
conditions stated in the franchises. By the terms of NSP's tariff on
file with the PSC, the rate payers are surcharged two per cent on
their utility bills because of the franchise fee being paid to the city.
Minot-In June, 1972, NSP was given franchises 74 to operate its
electric and telephone utilities in the city for a period of twenty years.
The ordinances both recite that for the privilege of operating in the
city, the company may be obligated to pay a franchise fee equal
to two per cent of gross revenues (as defined) earned in the city.
The electric franchise requires a separate ordinance to implement
the franchise fee, and further provides that the fee may be increased
at stated intervals to a total of five per cent. The telephone fran-
chise provides that the implementing ordinance may not be adopted
by the city until the federal excise tax on telephone service is reduc-
ed by at least two per cent. The rest of the terms are the same
as the electric franchise with respect to the franchise fee. No fran-
chise fee ordinance has yet been adopted by the city, but Northern
States Power would, as it does in Grand Forks, begin immediately
to surcharge the ratepayers at Minot to pass the franchise fee along
as part of its rate.
West Fargo-This city gave Northern States Power a franchise
in February 1972, granting the company the right to operate within
the city for a period of twenty years, but without any apparent con-
sideration for the privileges so exercised.7 5
Jamestown-Otter Tail Power Company was granted a twenty
year franchise76 to operate its electric system in the city in July, 1965.
There was no consideration for the franchise.7 7
73. GRAND FORKS, N.D., ORDINANCES § 1398 and § 1399 (1968).
74. MrNoT, N.D., ORDINANCES § 1785 and § 1786 (1972).
75. WEST FARGO, N.D., ORDINANCE § 173 (1972).
76. JAMESTOWN, N.D., ORDINANCE § 428 (1965).
77. Id. Jamestown received a percentage of Otter Tail's gross revenues, as defined,
earned In the city by the terms of JAMESTOWN, N.D., ORDINANCE § 262 (1932). The con-
sideration so exacted was described as compensation for the right and privileges granted
to the utility, and was further conditioned on the city's agreeing not to authorize a mu-
nicipal electric plant. The payments were to be treated as operating expenses of the
utility. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company furnishes 13 local exchange telephones
free of charge during the 20 years of its franchise, and agrees that the city may attach
the city's fire alarm and police signal wires to the company's poles. Letter from Earl W.
Benser, Vice President and General Manager, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, to
City Council, Jamestown, N.D., June 4, 1963. The local CATV operator pays the city
2-1/2% of its gross annual revenues (retail) for the privileges granted by a 10 year
franchise. JAMESTOWN, N.D., ORDINANCE 1 401 (1964).
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Fargo-As a home rule city, Fargo can adopt an ordinance levy.
ing a tax on the franchise given a utility. It can also, as can other
cities, exact a charge for the privileges conferred by the grant of
the franchise. In any event, ratepayers of Northern States Power
are being surcharged two per cent pursuant to Northern States
Power's tariff, because of the fact that Fargo is exacting something
from that utility, under one or both of the theories upon which such
exactions can there be made.
It remains to be considered what the relationship of a city to a
utility is in the matter of rates for municipal uses of the utility
service when the rates are not agreed upon in, or as consideration
for, the franchise. North Dakota law provides, in the municipal code,
that cities are allowed to contract 78 for certain utility services re-
quired for city purposes. The power of the city to contract, however,
is subject to the PSC's regulatory powers with reference to contract
rates. A general power to approve contract rates is given to the
PSC79 in the utility code.
Two examples may suffice to illustrate some of the apparent dis-
crepancies in this area mentioned in the preceeding paragraph. In
Minot, the rates paid to Northern States Power for municipal uses
of electricity conform, in almost every detail, to the tariffs Northern
States Power has on file at the PSC for municipal service.8 0 One
may conclude that, for Minot, the power to contract for municipal
uses of utility service is a nullity. At Jamestown, the rates paid by
the city to Otter Tail Power Company vary from the municipal tar-
iffs on file with the commission. The rates for Jamestown are con-
tained in a document entitled "Municipal Contract," '81 however, so
it may be concluded that Jamestown has taken advantage of the
power it has to contract for rates outside a franchise. Of course,
this power is limited by the PSC's power to approve those rates
set by contract, after such rates are filed with the PSC. But a check
with the PSC discloses that the Jamestown contract rates are not
filed and approved, 2 and that Otter Tail's municipal contract forms
which include contract rates are apparently only filed for information-
al purposes.8 3 Municipal contracts are not required to be filed and
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-05 (1960).
79. N.D. CENT. CODE I 49-04-07 (1960).
80. Rates paid by the municipality to Northern States Power were described as the
city's water pumping, sewer pumping, and street lighting contracts with the utility.
Northern States Power's tariffs on file for municipal service were furnished by the PSC.
The tariffs were effective on October 21, 1971. Letter from R. A. Schempp, Finance Di-
rector, City of Minot, to Daniel E. Buchanan, Aug. 15, 1972.
81. Jamestown, N.D. and Otter Tail Power Co. contract, May 4, 1964. This was fur-
nished by Rex C. Brisben, City Auditor, Jamestown, and was compared to Otter Tail
Municipal Contract forms on file with the PSC, and furnished by the PSC.
82. Letter from Wallace M. Owen, Chief Engineer, PSC, to Daniel E. Buchanan, Aug.
25, 1972.
83. Id.
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approved . 4 Thus, one may conclude that the provisions in the utility
code administered by the PSC are a nullity in the case of Jamestown.
The PSC clearly has the authority and the responsibility to act in
individual cases on municipal contracts, but apparently leaves that
area of rate regulation to the utilities also.
One of the running legal battles being waged for approximately
a half century in North Dakota, is the conflict over rate concessions
or other consideration for cities when giving franchises to utility
companies. The PSC has acted repeatedly to curtail what it saw
as discriminatory practices, only to be found exceeding its authority
each time the courts have considered the issue. The PSC, in its de-
sire to regulate the relationship between utilities and cities when the
relationship is grounded in a municipal franchise, has even attempted
to issue orders directly contrary to Supreme Court decisions on the
subject. Its resourcefulness in dealing with the evil it sees is seem-
ingly endless. It has devised extra-statutory ways of dealing with
what it must see as unrepentant cities exploiting utility ratepayers.
While the PSC tries to find statutory power to regulate franchise
rates, it waives other clear statutory duties that are designed to
provide a way for the utility to be reimbursed for local exactions.
It also waives, in an indeterminate number of cases, the duties it
has in approving and regulating reasonable contract rates between
cities and utilities. One cannot dismiss the impression that the PSC
displays an attitude of paternalism and self satisfaction; that it thinks
it knows what is best for all concerned, and that it will administer
the laws with a sense of equity and fair dealing for all, regardless
of pronouncements by the Supreme Court or the legislature to the
contrary. There is a presumption that public officials have done their
duty, and such presumption is not to be overcome except by evidence
to the contrary. But the evidence seems overwhelming that the com-
mission does its duty as it sees it, and not otherwise.
If the PSC's behavior in the area discussed in this article is a
result of a genuine concern for ratepayers in other cities than the
exacting city, then the PSC should go to the legislature to ask for
appropriate and constitutionally permissible authority to intervene
in the area they insist on regulating. Otherwise, the PSC should act
within the provisions of the statutes giving it the power to act, and
which prescribe the precise and only way in which the PSC can act.
84. Id. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-04-07 (1960), which is the requirement that the
PSC approve the filed municipal contracts with utilities.
